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This thesis investigated the association of cognitive abilities and strategy shifting 
within a procedural-motor task. College students traced or drew various forms of a 
figure-8 before completing a battery of cognitive tests. A pilot study identified three 
distinct strategies for drawing a figure-8, whereas the current study manipulated the 
figure-8 stimuli to encourage these strategies at various points. Phase 1 had two 
counterbalanced conditions which instructed participants to trace versus draw a rotated 
figure-8. Phase 2 gradually morphed a figure-8 such as to encourage the three 
predominant strategies. Phase 3 was a condition which included stimuli from Phases 1 
and 2. The data suggest that Perceptual flexibility was associated with effective strategy 
shifting in all three main phases of the experiment, whereas Verbal and Executive 
flexibility had no impact on strategy shifting. Furthermore, Perceptual flexibility was 
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When people perform tasks in the real world, it is necessary to change strategies 
when the current strategy is not working. In order to be adaptive and change strategies, 
they have to take a different point of view and adapt to the immediate constraints of the 
situation. This ability to identify a need for a change in strategy as well as to select and 
execute a superior strategy is presumably a product of different cognitive faculties that 
vary among individuals. This master‟s thesis investigates some of the cognitive faculties 
that predict the ability of college students to shift strategies in a perceptual motor task of 
drawing figure-8s.  
Early cognitive research often had the simplifying assumption that cognitive 
processes are universal and largely invariant across individuals and tasks. As the field 
matured, it became more important to examine individual differences. It is now 
appreciated that different people recruit different strategies to perform the same task 
(Miller et al., 2002; Schaeken, De Vooght, Vandierendonck, & d'Ydewalle, 2000). From 
the standpoint of this present study on strategy shifting, it is conceivable that cognitive 
adaptability or flexibility is a trait necessary to explain the dynamic nature of cognitive 
processes as individuals adjust and adapt their available resources to ongoing 
circumstances. Given the variation in the structure and functioning of the brain, the 
construct of inherent flexibility may perhaps be quantified and used to predict differences 
in cognitive performance among individuals, as well as within a given individual over 
time. 
Along these lines, researchers have attempted to identify the characteristics of 
people (i.e., individual differences) who exhibit a propensity for flexible strategy use. 
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Schunn and Reder (2001) analyzed the Kanfer–Ackerman Air Traffic Control Task (a 
dynamic Air Traffic Control simulator) and found that a person‟s ability to select and 
execute a correct strategy is governed mostly by working memory capacity and reasoning 
ability. Reasoning ability was also correlated with the ability to determine when a 
particular strategy was not working. However, Alderton and Larson (1994) found no 
relationship between fluid intelligence and strategy shifting on a mental rotation task. It 
may be the case that strategy shifting depends on the type of task or domain of cognitive 
activities. For example, Roberts and Roberson (2001) analyzed a spatial task wherein 
individuals must build a cognitive map based on compass directions, and reported that 
spatial reasoning ability predicts effective strategy shifting. 
People likewise may adopt particular strategies that depend on their particular 
cognitive strengths and/or limitations. Kail (1988) reported that limitations in processing 
speed generally affect performance and efficient strategy use, whereas Just and Carpenter 
(1992) reported that limitations in working memory likewise influence strategy selection 
and execution. Differences in efficient strategy selection exist between experts and 
novices (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980). 
For example, Chi et al. (1981) found that physics experts utilize their rich domain 
knowledge to create a small set of relevant strategies for solving a physics problem.  
There is some evidence that strategy shifting is related to the self-monitoring 
abilities of individuals in the face of feedback. This is manifested most dramatically in 
tasks where the individual encounters feedback and performance failure on previous trials 
(Brand, 2008; Lovett & Anderson, 1996; Reder, 1987). For example, Reder and Schunn 
(1999) found that strategy preferences were related to the proportion of previous trials 
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that a particular strategy had worked in the past. Reder and Schunn (1999) also found that 
a person's ability to shift strategies may be related to how well they interpret feedback 
from the task environment and how well they can monitor the effectiveness of their 
strategies. Appropriate strategy selection is related to one's awareness of strategy use; 
those who are more cognizant of the strategies they use tend to perform better (Ghatala, 
Levin, Pressley, & Lodico, 1985; Pressley, Borkowski, & O'Sullivan, 1984).  
While recognizing the need for a change in strategy is a priori necessary for 
effective strategy use, these realizations are not only due to characteristics of the 
individual, but also to environmental changes. Moreover, these changes in the 
environment may not influence strategy shifting uniformly in all situations. Depending on 
the degree to which the environment alters, the individual‟s awareness of a need to shift 
strategies might differ. 
Conceptually-driven vs. Stimulus-driven Shifting 
The realization that a change in strategy is imperative could arise in two fashions: 
conceptually-driven (top-down) or stimulus-driven (bottom-up). The former occurs when 
the task or environment has noticeably changed, the demand for a new strategy is 
apparent, and the person generates goals to handle the situation. The latter consists of one 
or a series of relatively small changes in the task, stimulus, or environment; this might 
make it more ambiguous when the exact moment an alternate strategy becomes superior. 
Bröder and Schiffer‟s (2006) dual-system theory of strategy selection assumes 
that strategy selection is either consciously deliberated (conceptually-driven) or driven by 
a slow learning process (stimulus-driven). Evidence exists for both modes of strategy 
selection. In a hypothetical stock market game with differing payoff structures, Bröder 
and Schiffer (2006) observed both quick adaptation to new environments and slow 
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adaptation to changing environments, suggesting different principles of strategy selection 
at different points in time. This is referred to as the dual-mode phenomenon. 
Other studies examining a hypothetical stock market game suggest that effortful 
selection is associated with intelligence measures (Bröder, 2003) and attention (Bröder & 
Schiffer, 2003), whereas the learning-driven process has been superior in other situations. 
For example, when asking participants to select between multiple options (e.g., which 
company is the most trustworthy), Rieskamp and Otto (2006) found that a learning 
process reinforced by feedback best explained individuals‟ performance.  
Ghinescu (2010) analyzed strategy selection in a flanker task, which instructed 
participants to identify the middle letter (S or H) in various strings of Ss and Hs. 
Immediately prior to the task, they were provided cues as to the probability of a 
compatible-noise (one letter) or incompatible-noise (different letters) trial in order to 
minimize response times and error rates. Participants who were not given information as 
to the purpose of the cues performed similarly to those who were given the exact 
probabilities. Afterwards, when asked to provide the probability associated with each cue, 
the participants with no knowledge performed no better than chance. This supports the 
notion of an implicitly-learned, subconscious strategy selection, as opposed to conscious 
strategy selection or routinized top-down strategy execution. 
While the existence of the dual-mode phenomenon has been supported, there has 
been little research that explores the cognitive abilities associated with the conceptually-
driven and stimulus-driven models. It is possible that one measure (e.g., general 
intelligence) might operate on both modes of strategy shifting. On the other hand, it is 
plausible to assume that an aptitude in working memory or fluid intelligence translates to 
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better performance for the goal-driven task while superior perceptual ability would 
dominate stimulus-driven shifting. Moreover, one might hypothesize that a major 
difference between top-down and bottom-up strategy selection might be the amount of 
cognitive effort exerted and the planning time required to switch strategies. 
Planning Time 
The selection and/or switching of strategies should require time to plan. However, 
Walsh and Anderson (2009) suggested for problem-solving tasks that strategy selection is 
an iterative, ongoing process. As individuals work through a problem, they do not plan 
and think about a strategy: they start to act before they have a strategy in mind. On the 
other hand, numerous studies have consistently shown a cost in speed or accuracy (or 
both) as a result of shifting strategies between tasks (Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, 
2000 provide reviews). For example, Monsell, Sumner, and Waters (2003) reported an 
increase in both reaction time and errors when individuals had to switch from classifying 
a digit as high or low to classifying the digit as odd or even. The switch cost is typically 
reduced as the task becomes easier (Luwel, Schillemans, Onghena, & Verschaffel, 2009; 
Sumner & Ahmed, 2006) or when only one appropriate strategy exists (Allport, Styles, & 
Hsieh, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Spector & Biederman, 1976; Ruthruff, 
Remington, & Johnston, 2001). Over two experiments, Luwel et al. (2009) examined the 
switch cost within a task and found a reduction in speed after a strategy change, but no 
cost to accuracy, irrespective of whether or not one strategy was superior. 
The task switch cost could potentially explain why some individuals persist in a 
suboptimal strategy (e.g., Luwel, Lemaire, & Verschaffel, 2005; Luwel, Verschaffel, 
Onghena, & De Corte, 2003; Roberts, Taylor, & Newton, 2007). Perhaps some 
individuals intuitively understand that the cost of switching strategies is greater than the 
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benefit granted by the superior strategy. On the other hand, it may in fact be a 
metacognitive deficiency; the Dunning-Kruger effect (Kruger & Dunning, 1999) 
stipulates that individuals persist with erroneous judgments because their lack of 
metacognitive ability deprives them of realizing it. Hence, a lack of metacognitive 
awareness might inhibit people from realizing they have selected an inferior strategy. 
Pilot Study 
Researchers at Sandia National Labs, the University of Notre Dame, and the 
University of Memphis piloted many different tasks in a procedural-motor line-drawing 
experiment. Most of the tasks required the participants to trace or draw a figure-8 on a 
tablet PC. Figure 1
1
 shows an individual engaged in the task. When tracing the figure-8, 
there was only one window displayed, but the drawing condition had a drawing area in a 
separate window. Participants received visual feedback during and after each trial, 
namely the speed and accuracy of their drawing, represented as a percentage, as well as 
the product of these two, called the composite score. Figure 2 displays a screenshot of the 
interface, with the speed, accuracy, and composite score feedback bars for the current 
trial, composite scores for previous trials, and the drawing subregion in view. During 
each trial, feedback bars were dynamically displayed at the top of the screen; the speed 
bar would decrease with time, the accuracy bar would increase as participants completed 
the figure, and the composite would vary as a function of the two. After each trial, the 
numerical values of the speed, accuracy, and composite score were displayed in the 
drawing subregion. Finally, in between the feedback bars and the drawing subregion was 
a bar that displayed the composite score from the previous trials in the current phase. 
                                                             
1 Referenced figures can be found in the Appendix 
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The experimental conditions in the pilot study varied either the figure or the 
instructions and feedback. Stimulus variants included random sizes of the figure-8, 
presenting the figure-8 horizontally and describing it as an infinity sign, presenting 
various shapes and asking the participants to draw them from memory, and a figure-8 
rotated at various angles, where the participants were asked to trace the figure or draw the 
rotated figure-8 in a separate grid. Instruction/feedback modifications included asking the 
participants to focus on speed or accuracy (with feedback scores adjusted accordingly), 
presenting the standard figure-8 but removing the marks from the pen, presenting the next 
trial at random intervals, and giving the subjects a random time range before the trial 
would time out (which would result in a score of zero). 
The goal of the pilot study was to identify different strategies that people might 
use in performing the task. Figure 3 displays the three strategies exhibited by the 
participants. In the figure, the dots refer to where the stylus first made contact with the 
screen; a second dot indicates that the participant removed the stylus from the screen and 
placed it down again. As the stylus moves farther from the dot, the lines fade to indicate 
the drawing direction.  
Strategy A (Circles) was defined as any trial in which a participant drew one full 
circle, picked up the stylus, placed it back on the screen, and drew the other circle. 
Strategy B (Middle) was defined as any trial in which the stylus was originally placed in 
any intersection point between the circles, and the figure was completed in one 
continuous motion (i.e., without removing and replacing the stylus from the screen). 
Finally, Strategy C (Extreme) was defined as any trial in which the stylus was not 
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originally placed in the intersection between the circles, and the figure was completed in 
one continuous motion. Any trial not fitting these criteria was classified as „Other.‟ 
Some interesting contrasts were discovered when we analyzed the stream of 
strategies from trial to trial. One interesting contrast between conditions emerged and 
motivated this thesis. In the two rotated angle conditions, participants preferred the 
Circles strategy (almost 60% of trials). However, when tracing, they preferred the Middle 
strategy (almost 70% of trials). Thus, when the college students were given the angle 
draw condition followed by the angle trace condition, or vice versa, they were prone to 
shift strategies. This reliable shift in strategies served as a benchmark task for exploring 
individual differences in strategy shifting.  
One could imagine any number of different individual differences that might be 
associated with strategy change. Creativity, for example, might reflect an open mind that 
cherishes novelty; an aptitude in mental flexibility or perceptual flexibility might allow a 
person to look at things from a different perspective. Those with superior executive 
functioning might exhibit the ability to stay focused (or too focused!) on the task at hand 
and identify the superior strategy for each context (Baddeley, 2003; Miyake, Friedman, 
Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000; Schunn & Reder, 2001). A measure of general 
intelligence (Bröder, 2003) might be all that is required to predict strategy shifting. 
Results from the pilot study suggested that creativity was associated with more strategy 
exploration, while those with a high working memory span and verbal ability tended to 
identify a preferred strategy and perseverate with it. 
The Present Study 
The current study sought to elicit changes in strategy via task manipulation and 
identify the cognitive abilities associated with effective strategy selection.  That is, will 
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modifying a figure-8 cause participants to trace it differently? Would drawing versus 
tracing the figure cause them to use a different method? Finally, will there be any 
cognitive abilities associated with the ability to change strategies, and if so, do 
contrasting tasks require different abilities? 
The results from the pilot study suggest that when tracing a rotated figure-8, 
participants elect to follow the Middle strategy whereas they prefer the Circle strategy 
when drawing the same figure in a separate area. Thus, the current study counterbalanced 
the two rotated angle conditions to measure how quickly an individual would shift 
strategies. Although the presented stimuli are identical, this might be considered 
conceptually-driven strategy change because the change in task is immediate and 
sufficiently different to produce a change in strategy. 
In the second phase of the experiment, we had conditions that encouraged each 
individual to employ strategies that were not preferred. This was accomplished by 
manipulating the figure-8 in a fashion that elicits a particular strategy in a stimulus-driven 
fashion. Specifically, the figure-8 gradually morphed into different shapes that would 
encourage the three predominant strategies summarized in Figure 3. This might be 
considered stimulus-driven strategy change because of the small changes in the stimulus 
from trial to trial whereas the task remained constant. 
In a third phase of the experiment, we investigated how well an individual could 
employ desired strategies when presented with random selections from the previous 
stimulus manipulations. This would be considered an overall measure of effective 
strategy selection as well as learning within the task. 
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One hypothesis and prediction is that our stimulus manipulations will effectively 
and reliably produce the desired change in strategies. Second, Bröder and Schiffer (2006) 
reported that individuals make swift adjustments in novel situations but are much slower 
to respond to gradual transitions in the task. If drawing versus tracing and a gradually 
morphed figure are examples of conceptually-driven and stimulus-driven strategy change 
(respectively), then strategy change in drawing versus tracing should manifest itself 
immediately relative to the gradual morph. However, Bröder and Schiffer (2006) argue 
that conceptually-driven strategy change requires conscious deliberation, and Luwel et al. 
(2009) and Sumner and Ahmed (2006) suggest a greater switch cost for the more difficult 
task. Thus, planning time for drawing versus tracing will be greater than the gradual 
morph. Planning time for the combination of the two (the learning condition), then, 
should lie somewhere in-between. Finally, as the previously discussed research suggests, 
we expect that not all individuals will change strategies identically, and that measures of 




The sample was comprised of 50 college undergraduate students enrolled in a 
southern college in the United States. The sample included 31 females and 19 males, and 
all but one were between the ages of 16 and 24. Forty-five had 13 to 15 years of 
education, with three having more and two having fewer. Ethnic backgrounds included 
22 African Americans, 22 Caucasians, 4 Asians, 1 Hispanic, and 1 listing „Other‟. All 
participants were selected from Introduction to Psychology courses and volunteered to 





Apparatus. The primary apparatus was a Wacom Techno Cintiq 21UX
TM
 LCD 
touch-screen (43 cm x 33mm). The drawing task was performed in a subregion 
measuring approximately 22cm x 22cm. The system had a synchronization rate of 60 Hz, 
a response time of 20 ms, and a maximum report rate of 145 points/sec. The drawing task 
was performed using a stylus on the surface of the monitor. 
Procedure 
The experiment was divided into two stages that took approximately one hour 
each. The first stage was the line-drawing task whereas the other was a battery of 
individual differences measures. 
Line Drawing. Participants completed a series of line drawing tasks in which 
they traced or drew a series of figure-8s that were displayed on the screen. Participants 
were unaware of the purpose of the experiment, and were given no additional instructions 
on how to trace or draw the figures. There was a within-subjects design in which 
participants completed each of eight conditions in four phases. The first phase (Phase 0, 
Practice) allowed participants to become acquainted with the task and equipment. 
Participants first completed a practice session (Unguided, 10 trials) with no feedback; the 
next block (Baseline, 20 trials) added the visual feedback as described in the pilot study. 
The next phase (Phase 1, Implicit Bias) presented a figure-8 that was rotated two-
dimensionally at various angles. There were two conditions: in one condition, 
participants were asked to trace the figure (Angle Trace, 20 trials); in the other, the figure 
was displayed on the left half of the screen and subjects were asked to draw the figure on 
the right half (Angle Draw, 20 trials). Ordering of the Draw and Trace conditions were 
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counterbalanced across participants. Examples of the Baseline, Angle Trace and Angle 
Draw stimuli can be seen in Figure 4. 
Phase 2 (Explicit Bias) consisted of three counterbalanced conditions which 
morphed the standard figure-8 into shapes that would encourage each of the strategies 
mentioned above (Encourage Circles, Encourage Middle, and Encourage Extreme, 27 
trials each). The standard figure-8 was presented for the first five trials, trials 6 through 
17 represented the morph from beginning to acme, and trials 18 through 27 represented 
the reversion towards the original figure-8. Figure 5 shows the figures for the morph 
conditions, whereas Figure 6 shows enlarged images of trials 6, 13, and 17. It should be 
noted that the location of the figure-8 changes from the previous trial to discourage 
practice effects. 
Finally, Phase 3 presented figures from Phases 1 and 2 (Learning, 31 trials). The 
same 31 figures were shown to each participant, but in random order. There were 8 trials 
for each of the encourage conditions with multiple (and equal) degrees of the morph for 
each, and 7 trials from Angle Trace. 
Individual Differences Measures. Following the line-drawing task, participants 
completed a battery of tests that measured various cognitive abilities. Each of the tasks 
was administered via computer. 
Participants self-reported their SAT Reasoning Test or American College Test 
(ACT) score. An ACT score was converted to an equivalent SAT score using the ACT-
SAT concordance table provided on the ACT website (ACT, 2008). The participants 
were asked if they had taken the original SAT or the new version. The original SAT 
scores range from 400 to 1600, and the new version ranges from 600 to 2400. 
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The Automated Operation Span Task (OSPAN, Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & 
Engle, 2005) was administered as a measure of working memory. In this task, 
participants were first presented with a math operation to solve in their head (e.g., (1 * 3) 
+ 1 = ?); the next screen displayed an answer (e.g., 5) and asked them to click either a 
"true" or "false" as to whether the number was a correct answer to the computation. 
Finally, after responding true or false, participants were presented with a letter to be 
recalled later. This sequence of computation-digit-decision-letter cycled for 3-7 iterations 
on each trial. At the end of each trial, participants were asked to recall (in order) each of 
the three to seven letters that they were presented with after each math operation. There 
were 15 trials altogether, with scores ranging from 0 to 75. 
The Remote Association Task (RAT, Mednick, 1963) was administered as a 
measure of creativity. In this task, participants were presented with a triad of words, and 
then asked to enter a word that connects all three words. For example, given the words 
„super‟, „ship‟, and „gazer‟, the desired answer would be „star‟. There were 20 possible 
questions, and the participants had 5 minutes to answer as many as possible. 
Spatial reasoning was tested using the Shepard and Metzler Mental Rotation Task 
(Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Participants were shown two 3-D images and asked to 
determine whether or not the figures, if rotated, were the same. They had one minute to 
judge as many figures as possible. A correct answer was scored as a „1‟, whereas 
incorrect answers received a „-1‟. Thus, the upper and lower bounds of the scores were 
only limited by how many figures the participant could evaluate in one minute, and 
chance was zero no matter how many figures a participant judged. 
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Fluid intelligence was measured using the Raven‟s Progressive Matrices test 
(Raven, 1941), a pattern-matching task where participants were asked to select the 
missing section of a 3x3 complex design from six choices. There were 12 patterns, and 
participants had 5 minutes to complete the task. Possible scores for Ravens range from 0 
to 12. 
Selective and sustained attention was measured by a visual search task (The Ruff 
2 and 7 Selective Attention Test, Ruff & Allen, 1996). In each trial, participants were 
presented with a 50x3 block of numbers or numbers and letters and asked to cross out 
only the 2s and 7s. There were 20 trials (10 with only numbers, and 10 with numbers and 
letters), and participants had 15 seconds to cross out as many 2s and 7s as possible. The 
total speed and accuracy scores are based on normed data, and range from 19 to 81 for 




Descriptive statistics (including the means, standard deviations, minimums and 
maximums) for each individual differences measure are presented in Table 1. No 
participants reported having taken the new SAT (out of 2,400). The scores on the RAT 
were lower than expected, with participants averaging only one correct answer. The 
participants also had difficulty with the mental rotation task because the average score 
was slightly below chance. The scores on the computerized version of the Ruff 2 & 7 





Descriptive Statistics for Individual Differences Measures 
Measure             M                  SD                 Min                 Max 
SAT 1017.40 140.93 740 1240 
RAT 1.00 1.60 0 7 
OSPAN 25.16 17.81 0 61 
Ravens 8.38 2.52 2 12 
Mental Rotation -0.28 2.30 -5 6 
Ruff Speed 29.60 6.47 19 44 
Ruff Accuracy 32.18 12.83 19 56 
 
 
An exploratory principal components analysis was conducted to examine 
relationships among the measures of cognitive ability. We used Varimax rotation with 
Kaiser Normalization in order to produce independent factors. A Scree test indicated a 
three-component solution that explained 60.8% of the variance. Each component had an 
Eigenvalue greater than one. The first component explained 29.1% of the variance 
(Eigenvalue = 2.0), the second explained an increment of 21.4% (Eigenvalue = 1.5), and 
the third explained an additional 14.3% of the variance (Eigenvalue = 1.0). Table 2 




Component 1 contained two measures that express Verbal flexibility (SAT and 
RAT) because both of these tests have heavy verbal influences. Two out of the three 
sections of the SAT are reading and writing, whereas the RAT asks participants to 
produce a single word that would complete three separate two-word English phrases. The 
second component had two measures that describe Executive flexibility (OSPAN and 
Ravens). The two tests comprising this component tap into working memory and fluid 
intelligence. The third component contained three measures that reflect Perceptual 
flexibility (Rotation, Ruff Speed, and Ruff Accuracy). The mental rotation and Ruff 2 & 7 





Item 1 2 3 
SAT Reasoning Test 0.67   
Remote Associates 0.81   
Raven‟s Matrices  0.77  
Operation Span  0.78  
Mental Rotation   0.64 
Ruff Accuracy   0.66 
Ruff Speed   0.74 
Note. Values below 0.5 are suppressed. 
 
A median split was calculated for each factor in order to separate the high 
performers from the low performers. The median for Verbal, Executive, and Perceptual 
flexibility were -0.222, 0.103, and 0.017, respectively. 
Strategy Use 
Table 3 shows the proportions of strategy use in each condition. The Middle 
strategy was preferred overall, followed by Circles, and Extreme. The disparity between 
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Angle Trace and Angle draw found in the pilot study was even more robust in this 
experiment, with participants drawing using the Circles strategy in 76% of trials (row 4) 
but tracing using the Middle strategy 68% of the time (row 3).  
 
Table 3 
Overall Proportions of Strategy Use 
 Strategy 
Condition Circles Middle Extreme Other 
Unguided .22 .72 .04 .02 
Baseline .30 .65 .03 .03 
Angle Trace .28 .68 .03 .01 
Angle Draw .76 .13 .07 .04 
Encourage Circles .57 .40 .02 .02 
Encourage Middle .20 .72 .07 .01 
Encourage Extreme .09 .46 .44 .01 
Learning .30 .47 .21 .01 
Average .34 .51 .13 .02 
 
 
The proportions for the conditions in Phase 2 (rows 5, 6, and 7) suggest that the 
stimulus manipulations that encouraged particular strategies were successful for the 
Encourage Circles (Circles used on 57 percent of trials) and Encourage Middle (Middle 
used on 72 percent of trials) conditions. However, the Encourage Extreme condition 
appears to have been unsuccessful since the Middle strategy was used more frequently 
(46 percent versus 44 percent). These values are somewhat misleading because the first 
five trials had no encouraged strategy. Table 4 displays the proportions only for the trials 
in which a morphed figure was presented (trials 6-27). Given the apparent drop in the 
popularity of the encouraged strategy for Encourage Middle (row 2), subsequent analyses 
do not include this condition.  
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Additionally, participants drew the encouraged strategy on trial 17 (the height of 
the morph) 70 percent of the time and 84 percent of the time on trial 18, suggesting a lag 
effect. Thus, analyses on strategy shifting in Phase 2 will include trial 18 as part of the 
initial phase of the morph. 
 
Table 4 
Proportions of Strategy Use in Trials 6-27 of the Morph Conditions 
 Strategy 
Condition Circles Middle Extreme Other 
Encourage Circles .59 .39 .01 .02 
Encourage Middle .29 .60 .10 .02 





Implicit Bias. We computed strategy shifting in Phase 1 by identifying the modal 
strategy for each participant in the final five trials of the first condition in Phase 1 (either 
Angle Trace or Angle Draw), calculated the proportion of said strategy, and then 
subtracted the proportion of times the participant used the strategy in the first five trials 
of the following condition. For example, if a participant received Angle Draw first and 
used the Circles strategy four out of the last five trials, then proceeded to trace Circles 
one out of the first five trials of Angle Trace, then the resulting switch score would be 0.8 
- 0.2 = 0.6. Results from the pilot study suggest that strategy shifting decreases as a 
function of trials within a condition; hence the last five trials are the best indicator of each 
participant‟s preferred strategy for that condition. The first five trials of the next 
condition, then, provide a metric of strategy shifting.  
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The results indicated that strategy shifting and Verbal flexibility were not 
correlated, r(48) = .092, p > .526, nor were Strategy Shifting and Executive flexibility, 
r(48) = -.128, p > .376. However, strategy shifting and Perceptual flexibility were 
strongly correlated, r(48) = .484, p < .01, suggesting that higher levels of perceptual 
abilities are associated with more strategy shifting in Phase 1. 
Independent-samples t-tests were performed on the Phase 1 strategy shifting 
variable after the participants were segregated into high versus low scores on the median 
splits of each factor, Verbal flexibility, Executive flexibility, and Perceptual flexibility. 
As with the correlations, the results suggest that Perceptual flexibility was associated 
with more strategy shifting whereas there was no association with Verbal or Executive 
Flexibility and strategy shifting. Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations of the 
factors for Phase 1. 
 
Table 5 
Phase 1 Strategy Shifting 
 Low High  
Factor M SD M SD t p d 
Verbal .47 .32 .44 .28 .38 .24 .10 
Executive .48 .26 .43 .33 .57 .26 .17 
Perceptual .34 .24 .58 .30 3.13 < .01 .88 
Note. df = 49 for all factors. d refers to Cohen‟s d. 
 
Explicit Bias. The second experimental phase morphed the figure-8 in a fashion 
that encourages each of the predominant strategies. We assessed strategy shifting in the 
morph conditions by identifying whether or not the participant employed the encouraged 
strategy on each trial (starting at trial 6) for each morph. Trial 18 was included in the 
analyses because participants actually drew the encouraged strategy more often than in 
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trial 17 due to a lag effect. Conditions in which a participant employed the encouraged 
strategy at least four times in the first five trials were considered „nonshifters‟ for that 
particular condition and were excluded from the analyses. There were 8 such individuals 
in Encourage Circles and 1 in Encourage Extreme. As explained earlier, Encourage 
Middle was not used for these analyses due to a reduction in the use of the Middle 
strategy during the morph. 
To analyze strategy shifting in the Explicit Bias phase, the 27 trials were split into 
four sections: the baseline (trials 1-5); the beginning stages of the morph (trials 6-12); the 
height of the morph (trials 13-18); and the reversion towards the standard figure-8 (trials 
19-27). Whether the participant drew the encouraged strategy or not (the encourage 
score) was then averaged across the trials within each section. Three separate one-way 
mixed analyses of variance were conducted. The between-groups variables consisted of 
the factors (Verbal, Executive, and Perceptual flexibility), each with two levels (high and 
low), whereas section was a within-subject variable with 4 levels. Figures 7, 8, and 9 
display the plots of the analyses. 
Verbal Flexibility. The results show that there was a significant main effect of 
section, F(3, 144) = 201.21, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .81, MSE = .02, indicating that participants 
drew the encouraged strategy more frequently as the morph increased and less frequently 
as it reverted back. There was no significant main effect of Verbal flexibility, F(1, 48) = 
2.04, p = .16, ηp
2
 = .04, MSE = .11, and no significant interaction between section and 
Verbal flexibility, F(3, 144) = 1.38, p = .25, ηp
2
 = .03, MSE = .02. 
Executive Flexibility. The results show that there was a significant main effect of 
section, F(3, 144) = 195.87, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .80, MSE = .02, indicating that participants 
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drew the encouraged strategy more frequently as the morph increased and less frequently 
as it reverted back. There was no significant main effect of Executive flexibility, F(1, 48) 
= .19, p = .67, ηp
2
 < .01, MSE = .11, and there was no significant interaction between 
section and Executive flexibility, F(3, 144) = .07, p = .98, ηp
2
  < .01, MSE = .02. 
Perceptual Flexibility. The results show that there was a significant main effect 
of section, F(3, 144) = 198.77, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .81, MSE = .02, indicating that participants 
drew the encouraged strategy more frequently as the morph increased and less frequently 
as it reverted back. There was a significant main effect of Perceptual flexibility, F(1, 48) 
= 4.61, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .09, MSE = .10, indicating that individuals with high perceptual 
scores drew the encouraged strategy more frequently than those with low perceptual 
scores. There was no significant interaction between trial and Perceptual flexibility, F(3, 
144) = .78, p = .51, ηp
2
 = .02, MSE = .02. 
The results of the Phase 2 analyses suggest that the encouraged strategy was 
drawn more frequently as the morph progressed across all three factors. However, there 
was no interaction between using the encouraged strategy across each section and the 
high versus low values of any of the factors. Finally, there was no main effect for the 
high vs. low values of Verbal flexibility and Executive flexibility, but individuals with 
high Perceptual flexibility scores drew the encouraged strategy more frequently than 
those with low scores. 
Learning. For the Learning condition, we calculated the proportion of times each 
participant used the expected strategy after removing the trials from the Explicit Bias 
Middle condition. Independent-samples t-tests were conducted on scores in the Learning 
condition with the median splits of the factors as the independent variables. There was no 
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difference between high and low Verbal or Executive flexibility scores, but those with 
higher Perceptual flexibility scores used the encouraged strategy more often, suggesting 
that more perceptive individuals were better able to identify the correct strategy. The 
means and standard deviations for the Learning scores are listed in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 
Learning Phase Strategy Shifting 
 Low High  
Factor M SD M SD t p d 
Verbal .69 .16 .72 .16 .61 .54     .17 
Executive .67 .16 .74 .16 1.40 .17     .40 
Perceptual .65 .15 .75 .16 2.33 .02     .66 
Note. df = 49 for all factors. d refers to Cohen‟s d. 
 
Conceptually-driven vs. Stimulus-driven. To assess if strategy change was 
more immediate in the Implicit Bias task (Phase 1) or the Explicit Bias task (Phase 2), we 
first computed a measure of strategy change in Phase 2 similar to the one used in the 
Phase 1. To do this, we calculated the average number of times a participant drew the 
encouraged strategy in trials 6 through 10 of the morph and subtracted it from the average 
number of times they drew the encouraged strategy in the first 5 trials (before the morph 
occurred). A paired-samples t-test was conducted with Phase 1 vs. Phase 2 as the 
independent variable and the degree of strategy change as the dependent variable. The 
results indicated that there was a greater degree of strategy change in the Implicit Bias 
task (Phase1, M = .46, SD = .29) than in the Explicit Bias task (Phase 2, M = .20, SD = 
.25), t(49) = 4.86, p < .001, d = 0.94. 
Planning Time 
Planning time for each trial was measured as the span of time (in milliseconds) 
between presentation of the stimulus and point of contact between the stylus and the 
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monitor. We considered the possibility that this might not account for instances where an 
individual touched the stylus to the monitor, but did not begin drawing (and thus 
continued to plan); however, this only occurred in a small number of trials. Scores 
beyond two standard deviations from the mean were excluded for all planning time 
analyses. 
Overall Planning Time. To ascertain whether or not a shift in strategy resulted in 
an increase in planning time, a paired-samples t-test was conducted across all trials with 
shift vs. non-shift as the independent variable and the overall planning time as the 
dependent variable. The first trial of each condition was removed because participants 
had no opportunity to shift from a previous trial in that condition. The results indicated 
that planning times in trials in which a participant shifted strategies (M = 814 
milliseconds, SD = 130) were significantly higher than trials in which they did not shift 
(M = 770, SD = 130), t(49) = 5.17, p < .001, d = 0.31. 
To assess planning time across the four phases of the experiment, a one-way 
repeated measures analysis of variance was conducted on planning time scores. The 
within-subject variable was phase, with four levels (Phases 0 through 3). The results 
show that there was a significant main effect of phase, F(3, 147) = 86.16, p < .001, ηp
2
 = 
.64, indicating that planning time for Implicit Bias (M = 972, SD = 155) was the highest, 
followed by Learning (M = 832, SD = 135), Practice (M = 781, SD = 169) and Explicit 
Bias (M = 699, SD = 145). The means and standard deviations for the planning time 





Planning Time by Phase 
Condition M SD 
Phase 0 781 169 
Phase 1 973 155 
Phase 2 699 145 
Phase 3 832 135 
 
To assess how planning time was associated with each of the factors, correlations 
between overall planning time (across all conditions) and the three factors indicated that 
planning time and Verbal flexibility were not correlated, r(48) = -.17, p = .24; planning 
time and Executive flexibility were inversely correlated, r(48) = -.30, p = .04; and 
planning time and Perceptual flexibility were positively correlated, r(48) = .31, p = .03. 
These results suggest that higher Executive flexibility scores are associated with shorter 
planning time, while higher Perceptual flexibility scores are associated with more 
planning.  
An independent-samples t-test was performed on the planning time variable for 
Phases 0 through 3 segregating the high and low median splits of each factor. There was 
a significant main effect for each factor. The results suggest that, overall, low Verbal 
flexibility scores are associated with more planning time than high Verbal flexibility 
scores; low Executive flexibility scores are associated with more planning time than high 
Executive flexibility scores; and high Perceptual flexibility scores are associated with 
more planning than low Perceptual flexibility scores. Table 8 shows the means and 






Phases 0-3 Planning Time 
 Low High  
Factor M SD M SD t p d 
Verbal 851 123 787 133 1.77 .08 .48 
Executive 857 127 781 125 2.11 .04 .62 
Perceptual 785 130 852 125 1.86 .07 .46 
Note. df = 49 for all factors. d refers to Cohen‟s d. 
 
Practice. An independent-samples t-test was performed on the Practice phase 
planning time variable and the high and low median splits of each factor. There was no 
significant effect for Executive flexibility; however, there was a significant effect for 
Verbal flexibility and Perceptual flexibility. The results suggest that low Verbal 
flexibility scores are associated with more planning time than high Verbal flexibility 
scores, whereas low Perceptual flexibility scores are associated with less planning than 
high Perceptual flexibility scores. Table 9 shows the means and standard deviations of the 
factors for the Practice phase. 
 
Table 9 
Phase 0 Planning Time 
 Low High  
Factor M SD M SD t p d 
Verbal 828 181 733 144 2.05 .05 .63 
Executive 811 144 750 188 1.28 .21 .36 
Perceptual 721 134 840 181 2.65 .01 .77 
Note. df = 49 for all factors. d refers to Cohen‟s d. 
 
Implicit Bias. An independent-samples t-test was performed on the Phase 1 
planning time variable and the high and low median splits of each factor. As in Phase 0, 
there was a significant effect for Perceptual flexibility, suggesting that individuals with 
high Perceptual flexibility scores took more time to plan than those with low scores. 
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There were no significant effects for Verbal flexibility or Executive flexibility. Table 10 
shows the means and standard deviations of the factors for Phase 1. 
 
Table 10 
Phase 1 Planning Time 
 Low High  
Factor M SD M SD t p d 
Verbal 983 111 962 191 .49 .63 .13 
Executive 1005 151 939 155 1.53 .13 .47 
Perceptual 926 131 1019 165 2.21 .03 .60 
Note. df = 49 for all factors. d refers to Cohen‟s d. 
 
Explicit Bias. Three separate one-way mixed analyses of variance were 
conducted on planning time. The between groups variables consisted of the factors 
(Verbal, Executive, and Perceptual flexibility), each with two levels (high and low) and 
section as a within-subject variable with 4 levels (trials 1-5, 6-12, 13-18, and 19-27). 
Figures 10, 11, and 12 display the plots of the analyses. 
Verbal Flexibility. The results show that there was a significant main effect of 
section, F(3, 144) = 9.84, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .17, MSE = .01. There was also a significant 
main effect for Verbal flexibility, F(1, 48) = 4.56, p = .04, ηp
2
 = .09, MSE = .07, which 
suggests that individuals with low Verbal flexibility scores plan more than those with 
high scores. However, there was no significant interaction between section and Verbal 
flexibility, F(3, 144) = .32, p = .81, ηp
2
 = .01, MSE = .01. 
Executive Flexibility. The results show that there was a significant main effect of 
section, F(3, 144) = 9.92, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .17, MSE = .01. There was a marginally 
significant main effect of Executive flexibility, F(1, 48) = 3.38, p = .07, ηp
2
 = .07, MSE = 
.07, indicating that individuals with low executive flexibility scores spent more time 
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planning than those with high executive flexibility scores. However, there was no 
significant interaction between section and Executive flexibility, F(3, 144) = .72, p = .54, 
ηp
2
 = .02, MSE = .01. 
Perceptual Flexibility. The results show that there was a significant main effect 
of section, F(3, 144) = 9.96, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .17, MSE = .01. There was no significant 
main effect of Perceptual flexibility, F(1, 48) = 1.08, p = .31, ηp
2
 = .02, MSE = .08. There 
was also no significant interaction between section and Perceptual flexibility, F(3, 144) = 
.93, p = .43, ηp
2
 = .02, MSE = .01. 
Learning. An independent-samples t-test was performed on planning time for 
Phase 3 and the high and low median splits of each factor. There was a marginally 
significant effect for Verbal flexibility and a significant effect for Executive flexibility, 
indicating that those with high scores take more time planning than those with low 
scores. There was no significant effect for Perceptual flexibility. Table 11 shows the 
means and standard deviations of the factors for Phase 3. 
The results from the analyses on planning time suggest that switching strategies 
demanded more thought than using the same strategy. Phase 1 (Implicit Bias) required 
more planning time than Phase 2 (Explicit Bias), and Phase 3 (learning), the combination 
of the two, was in between. The analyses on planning time related to the three factors 
indicate that, generally, Verbal and Executive flexibility were negatively associated with 
planning time or not at all, whereas individuals with high Perceptual flexibility tended to 






Phase 3 Planning Time 
 Low High  
Factor M SD M SD t p d 
Verbal 863 127 801 137 1.65 .11 .44 
Executive 877 132 786 124 2.51 .02 .72 
Perceptual 820 147 843 123 .60 .55 .15 
Note. df = 49 for all factors. d refers to Cohen‟s d. 
 
Discussion 
The results show that individuals with higher Perceptual flexibility shifted 
strategies more effectively, but Verbal and Executive flexibility showed no relationship 
with effective strategy use. Strategy shifting was more immediate in Phase 1 (Implicit 
Bias) than in Phase 2 (Explicit Bias), but completing the task required more time to plan. 
Switching strategies also increased planning time, and Perceptual flexibility was 
associated with higher planning time scores, whereas Verbal and Executive flexibility 
were negatively associated with planning time in most of the phases. 
The task and stimulus manipulations were largely a success, as we observed the 
expected changes in strategy in most of the experimental conditions.  The Encourage 
Middle condition was ineffective, most likely due to the fact that the Middle strategy was 
the most frequent overall. However, including the Encourage Middle condition in the 
analyses did not significantly change any of the results from Phase 2. 
In creating the Implicit and Explicit Bias Phases, we expected that they would 
align with a conceptually-driven and a stimulus-driven model of strategy shifting as 
suggested by the dual-mode phenomenon (Bröder and Schiffer 2006). This would predict 
that the novel environment (Implicit Bias) would result in a quicker adaptation to a new 
strategy than would the slowly changing environment (Explicit Bias). Furthermore, since 
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conceptually-driven strategy change would necessitate more cognitive effort, and the 
more difficult task would impart a higher switch cost (Luwel et al., 2009; Sumner and 
Ahmed, 2006), the Implicit Bias Phase should require more time to plan than in the 
Explicit Bias Phase. The results confirmed both of these hypotheses. 
The factors derived from the individual differences measures played a large role 
in explaining strategy shifting in each of the three main phases of the experiment. Across 
the three main phases, Perceptual flexibility was the factor most associated with strategy 
shifting, while Verbal and Executive flexibility were not associated at all. Given that the 
task required the ability to perceive changes in a figure displayed on a screen, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that individuals with greater perceptual acumen were better able to 
identify a change in the stimulus and the subsequent need to shift strategies. The task 
demanded that the participant view the stimulus as a whole (e.g., Encourage Extreme) or 
as two sections (e.g., Encourage Circles) at different points in the experiment. 
Recognizing and comprehending this concept is crucial to optimal strategy selection, and 
it may well be a trait possessed by those with higher Perceptual flexibility. 
Another major factor in switching strategies was planning time. As expected, 
shifting strategies required more time to plan across all phases of the experiment. This is 
consistent with previous research on task switching (Luwel et al., 2009; Monsell et al., 
2003) and diverges from the fluid strategy selection posited by Walsh and Anderson 
(2009). As noted above, the planning time for the Implicit Bias Phase was greater than 
for the Explicit Bias Phase, and the Learning Phase was in between the two, as expected. 
Higher planning time scores for the Practice Phase versus the Explicit Bias Phase were 
most likely due to participants adjusting to the task and the interface.  
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The factors also added insight into the nature of planning time in the experiment. 
Executive flexibility was negatively related to planning in the Learning Phase and all four 
phases were combined, whereas lower Verbal flexibility scores were associated with 
more planning in the Practice and Explicit Bias Phases. There are numerous possible 
explanations for the negative association between planning time and these two factors. 
Perhaps individuals with high Verbal and/or Executive flexibility are quick problem-
solvers and prefer to attack the problem immediately. If they are typically successful at 
problem-solving, they might have overestimated their ability in this particular task, 
falling prey to a metacognitive deficiency (Kruger and Dunning, 1999). Alternatively, 
they might have been wary of considering alternative strategies, fearing that taking the 
time to plan a new strategy would result in a lower score (Luwel et al., 2003; Luwel et al., 
2005; Roberts et al., 2007). 
High Perceptual flexibility scores, on the other hand, were generally associated 
with more time planning than low Perceptual flexibility scores. Since individuals with 
higher Perceptual flexibility also utilized the optimal strategy more frequently, this may 
be due to the fact that it simply took more time to identify the ideal strategy on each trial. 
In the Learning Phase, there was no difference in planning time between high and low 
Perceptual flexibility, yet the high Perceptual flexibility group exhibited superior strategy 
use. Taken together, these findings suggest that the individuals with higher Perceptual 
flexibility successfully learned the optimal strategies for the figures in the previous 
phases and were able to execute them without needing to plan their strategy. 
The idea that Perceptual flexibility appears to be a crucial element in planning is 
similarly consistent with various neuroimaging studies which have identified neural 
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correlates of planning and individual differences measures. An fMRI study by Pochon et 
al. (2001) showed that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was involved in planning of 
forthcoming sequential actions (also see Unterrainer, 2006 for a comprehensive review of 
the neuroimaging of planning). Mental rotation and visual search (the two attributes 
comprising our Perceptual flexibility factor) were both associated with the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex as well (Cohen et al., 1996; Eglin, Robertson, & Knight, 1991, 
respectively). Furthermore, the individual differences measures constituting the other 
factors were either not associated with the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (i.e., verbal, 
Paulesu, Frith, & Frackowiak, 1993; working memory, Osaka et al., 2004; Raven's 
Progressive Matrices, Prabhakaran, Smith, Desmond,  Glover, & Gabrieli, 1997) or have 
not yet been studied via neuroimaging (SAT). Results from these studies support the 
current findings that Perceptual flexibility is indeed a major component of planning. 
A potential limitation of this study is a lack of measures assessing motivation. 
Roberts, et al. (2007) note that without sufficient motivation, optimal strategy selection is 
unlikely to occur. Future research might address this issue by assessing how inclined each 
participant felt to perform well. Additionally, motivation  
could be increased with rewards for exceptional performance or by inducing competition. 
The latter could be accomplished by displaying a fictional partner‟s score that begins to 
surpass the participant‟s score as trials progress in each condition. 
While the results from the current study provide evidence that individuals with 
higher Perceptual flexibility exhibit superior strategy shifting, the task relied heavily on 
perceiving minute changes in the stimuli, as well as hand-eye coordination. Therefore, 
the task itself might have some bias in favor of these individuals. A future study 
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underway will involve the NASA Multi-Attribute Task Battery (MATB), a multi-tasking 
pilot simulator. Since multi-tasking typically requires Executive control (Bühner, König, 
Pick, and Krumm, 2006), perhaps superior strategy shifting will be found in individuals 
with higher Executive flexibility for the MATB task. If, on the other hand, Perceptual 
flexibility is again found to be the primary factor regarding strategy shifting, it would 
provide evidence supporting the argument that Perceptual flexibility is a dominant 
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Figure 5. Stimuli for Conditions 4, 5, and 6. From Top to Bottom: Encourage Circles, 







Figure 6. Key trials in Conditions 4, 5, and 6. From Top to Bottom: Encourage Circles, 














































Figure 12. Perceptual Flexibility by Planning Time for the Explicit Bias Phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
